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FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF DAMAGES
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A recent, responsible review of the law of damages begins with
this sentence "Probably no branch of the law is more confused, less
considered, or more often applied than damages." 1 A United States
Supreme Court Justice who once had been Chief Counsel for the
Internal Revenue Service described the tax law as "a field beset
with invisible boomerangs '2 and, on another occasion, as "so com-
plex as to be the despair of judges."'
It is the boundary of these two distinctive fields of law which
we propose to survey.4 It ought to be an area of special interest to
the general practitioner.' To him who is already in the case the
litigant ordinarily will turn for advice and assistance concerning
the tax consequences of a contemplated suit, a proposal of settle-
ment or a favorable or unfavorable judgment. As for the tax spe-
cialist, his competence in his specialty depends on his knowledge of
its points of contact with the various other branches of law, such
as damages. A tax lawyer ignorant of general legal problems and
principles is as handicapped as a general practitioner who does
not recognize a tax problem when he sees it.
It is not the objective of this article, of course, to make a tax
expert of anyone, even in the area under review and least of all to
minimize the general practitioner's need for the cooperation of the
tax specialist in specific instances and at crucial steps. Equally far
from our aim is offering an exhaustive analysis and collection of au-
thorities which will furnish a ready-made answer to any specific
problem now puzzling a tax expert. Rather, it is our modest pur-
pose to give recent illustrations of some actual tax problems which
have arisen from litigation and caused enough difficulty to find a
place in the reports; to place them in perspective; and to provide
IDevelopments in the Law-Damages, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1947).
2See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U. S. 6, 12 (1952).
. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 498 (1944).
4 For a trail-blazing article which covers the same territory, and more, see Plumb, Income Tax
on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 25 Cornell L. Q. 221, 26 Cornell L. Q. 16 (1940). See also Mertens,
Federal Income Taxation § 5.21 (1942); Note, Taxation of Damage Recoveries from Litigation, 40
Cornell L. Q. 345 (1955).
,,No other branch of the law touches human activities at so many points." Mr. Justice Jackson
speaking for the Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 494-5 (1944).
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a readily available reference to the decisions and rulings which have
dealt with those matters. Accordingly, the law as applied in given
cases takes priority in the discussion over our own ideas of what
it should be in the same cases, in unreported settlements, or in
hypothetical situations. Finally, we usually have placed the em-
phasis on the principles which determine the answers rather than
on the answers themselves.
As used herein, damages includes judgments and settlements
interchangeably. 6 Those judgments and settlements relating to di-
vorce and to the annulment of marriages, though forming a part of
the general subject now under consideration, are governed by spe-
cial rules and for that reason are excluded from the scope of the
present discourse. The question when a reportable or deductible
judgment for damages should be taken into account (involving
such doctrines as accrual and constructive receipt) is likewise be-
yond the pale of our attention. For present purposes, but present
purposes only, we indulge the pleasant assumption that all judg-
ments are collectible by the creditor and payable by the debtor
without great difficulty or delay.
In general, gains and losses suffered in litigation are not in a
class by themselves. They are merely special instances of the actual
or intended application of principles of federal income tax law
which embrace other classes of gains and losses. It follows from this
fact that the tax treatment of damages and settlements seldom, if
6 Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938), "We think that the distinction sought to be made
between acquisition through such a judgment and acquisition by a compromise agreement in lieu of





ever, depends on such common-law characterizations as torts, con-
tracts and trusts. The important categories are those of the revenue
law, and this means that the text of the applicable code should be
kept in mind.
The code, it must be conceded, rarely contains a complete and
final statement of the governing law, for here, even more than in
the case of other statutes, the gloss of administrative rulings and
court decisions is important. So true is this that it is difficult to
say whether the code should be considered a starting point rather
than a point of departure. Notwithstanding these reservations, the
text of the code is at least a point of reference or orientation which
should be kept in view, like a lighthouse, by all the legal mariners
who seek the harbor of minimized taxes.
To conclude these introductory remarks, a litigant who has ob-
tained a favorable, final judgment, or received money or other
property in settlement of a suit, sometimes faces an adversary more
formidable than the just vanquished, for the federal tax col-
lector may insist on sharing with him the fruits of victory. As for
the losing litigant, there are times when his loss, after taxes, may
be substantially less than the full amount which must be or has been
paid in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of a suit. The
tax opportunities of the losing litigant will be considered later,
in Part II.
PART I-FAVORABLE JUDGMENTS
As will be shown in more detail as we go along, a successful
litigant may urge that his recovery: (a) is not comprehended within
the broad concept of taxable income; (b) irrespective of possible
inclusion within the statutory purview of gross income, the judg-
ment is excluded from taxation by certain provisions of the code;
or (c) the recovery is entitled to one of the various types of rela-
tively preferential treatment specified in the present or the prior
code, which ever is applicable under the circumstances.
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which is co-
extensive with corresponding provisions of prior statutes, sweeps
"all income from whatever source derived" within the taxable
ambit of gross income. There are statutory illustrations of various
kinds of taxable income, but no statutory definition which may be
used as a criterion or test for determining whether an apparent
increase of wealth is real, is recognizable and is income. The opin-
7 See Commissioner v. Glenshow Glass Co., 348 U, S. 426, 431 (1955).
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ions of courts are similarly devoid of any authoritative definition
which may be used as "a touchstone to all future gross income
questions."'
As indicated above, there are certain specific statutory ex-
clusions from gross income. For example, section 102(a) of the
present code provides, as did the corresponding section of the prior
code, that "Gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Section 104(a)
contains the following additional provisions which are pertinent
here:
(a) In General.-Except in the case of amounts attrib-
utable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under
section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any
prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensa-
tion acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether






Bequest or inheritance. In the leading case of Lyeth v. Hoey,8
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a sum which
a son of a deceased daughter of a decedent received in compro-
mise of litigation attacking the validity of a will of the latter was
protected from the grasp of the collector by the provision ex-
cluding the taxation of the value of property acquired by inherit-
ance. The will had been drawn so as to benefit a charity at the
expense of the taxpayer. The Court pointed out that the tax-
payer's heirship underlay the compromise agreement. In a much
more recent case, the Tax Court denied the protection of the statu-
tory provision to a taxpayer who was unrelated to the decedent
but who had received money in settlement of litigation based on
the decedent's alleged contract to provide for the taxpayer, an em-
ployee, by will."
Workmen's compensation. In William L. Neill ° the taxpayer
had not received what ordinarily would be considered a workmen's
compensation award or judgment. The Tax Court, though doubting
that the provisions relating to workmen's compensation "are liter-
ally applicable," gave the benefit of provisions comparable to
those above quoted from section 104 to a policeman retired for
disability incurred in line of duty. An earlier decision by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1 insisted on a more lite.-al
8 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
, John Davies, 23 T. C. 524 (1954),
o 17 T. C. 1015 (1951).
"Waller v. United States, 180 F.2d 194 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
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application of the statutory language in question and a quite re-
cent pronouncement of the Tax Court 12 seems to look more favor-
ably on the restrictive decision of the Court of Appeals than on
the Tax Court's own more liberal holding in the Neill case.
Personal injuries. The precise scope of the exclusion of recov-
eries received "on account of personal injuries" has not been spelled
out in litigation or otherwise to the extent that might be expected.
This may be the result of two factors: (a) In the past, perhaps
more than will be true in the future, reliance has been placed on
the limitations of, or implied exclusions from, the statutory income
concept; and (b) revenue officials may have been reluctant to test
out every conceivable legal possibility of revenue at the expense
of an injured class whose net recoveries seldom are considered by
its members as full compensatory however impressive gross recov-
eries may seem to others.
In Joseph Frank": the Tax Court found that the taxpayer had
failed to establish that part of his recovery was based on an assault
and on that ground the court denied him the benefit of the ex-
press statutory exclusion for personal injuries. An early decision by
the Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court, held that damages
for libelling the taxpayer personally (not in his professional capac-
ity) were not within the statutory income concept. 14 A recent ad-
ministrative ruling placed the non-taxability of recoveries for
wrongful death on the same basis." It would seem that the latter
ruling at least could have been rested on the provisions of the
express exclusion of damages received on account of personal in-
juries. There is authoritative precedent from the field of general
law for applying the evident policy and not merely the literal and
express terms of a statute.16 As we learn still elsewhere, "the letter
killeth, but the spirit giveth life."
The interest on a personal injury judgment appears includible
in gross income on the basis of an early decision. 7 Damages related
to impaired earning capacity, past as well as future, may be entitled
to the benift of the exclusion of items received "on account of per-
sonal injuries." Despite what is said in a moment about the ab-
sence of any implied exclusion of punitive damages, exemplary
damages awarded in a personal injury case may be held within the
exclusion from gross income expressed in section 104(a)(2) and its
predecessors.
Punitive damages. In March 1955 the Supreme Court of the
United States handed down a decision in the case of Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 8 In that case the Supreme Court held that
treble or punitive damages awarded in federal antitrust litigation
were within the concept of income subjected to tax by section
22(a), the equivalent of the present section 61. In effect, the Court
Charles F. Brown, 25 T. C. 220 (1955)
5822 T. C. 945 (1954), off'd per curiam, 226 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1955). Whether income taxes should
be taken into account in fixing damages for personal injuries is, of course, o quite different ques-
tion. Cf. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1944) (no error in refusing to make a deduc-
tion for income taxes).
14 C. A. Hawkins, 6 B. T. A. 1023 (1927).
'5 Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179.
16 E. g., Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381 (1939).
5' Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B. T. A. 1339 (1933).
348 U. S. 426. (1955).
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held that the punitive damages constituted gross income and were
not the beneficiaries of any implied exclusion from gross income.
The Court pointed out that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had published his non-acquiescence in a contrary decision which
the Board of Tax Appeals had made in 1940 and consistently there-
after had asserted the taxability of such receipts.
Insider profits. On the same day that the Supreme Court de-
cided the Glenshaw Glass case, the Court also ruled taxable the
"insider profits" recovered by a corporation from a director who
had dealt in the securities of the corporation.1 9 With respect to
such profits the Court said, "There is no indication that Congress
intended to exempt them from coverage.
20
Whether income or recovery of capital. It is the clear import
of the two Supreme Court decisions just mentioned that all "gains"
are includible in gross income unless specifically excluded. This
still leaves open and at large the basic, bedrock question whether
a given recovery is a "gain" or "income" or, on the contrary, is a
recovery of capital. The answer to that question, as will be seen,
may depend in considerable measure on what relief counsel has
asked for in his pleading, the language of the agreement in com-
promise, and the proof presented on the respective trials. It may
not be surprising, in view of the above-mentioned confusion in
which the law of damages is enveloped, that the decision of this
tax issue seldom has been made to turn on the nature of damages
as a matter of stautuory or common law. In a recent case, however,
in which a portion of a recovery in a partnership accounting was
held capital, this factor was recognized as a favorable one to the tax-
payer under the circumstances.2'
(a) Recovery of capital. In Durkee v. Commissioner"2 the
appellate court was asked to decide the taxability of a sum which
the taxpayer, an electrical contractor, received in settlement of
a tort action which charged the defendants with combining to
injure the taxpayer's business. The court indicated its opinion
that a portion of the settlement represented a recovery of a capi-
tal item, goodwill, and it remanded the case to the Tax Court for a
" General American Investors Co. v. Commissioners, 348 U.S. 434 (1955). See also Commission-
ers v. Lo Bue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956) (holding certain options to purchase stock to be income).
M General American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 434.
21 Specialty Engineering Co., 12 T. C. 1173 (1949). See Uniform Partnership Act § 42.
m 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947). See also Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912
(6th Cir. 1932).
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determination, among other things, of the unrecovered basis of
the asset in question. The court was impressed by the fact that
the taxpayer had made no claim for lost profits as such and had
merely measured the damage to his goodwill by loss of income . 2
In Commissioner v. PenToad Corp.24 the taxpayer's recovery
of a large sum on trust principles, as a result of a stockholders'
derivative suit, was held to represent capital instead of income.
The suit which was settled had alleged a breach of trust in that in-
vestments of the taxpayer had been made for the benefit of an-
other corporation rather than for the advantage of the taxpayer.
Both the Tax Court and the appellate court agreed that the sums
recovered stood in place of losses or impairments of capital which
had been caused by the improper investment.
25
(b) Recovery held income. In a recent case the Tax Court
overruled the taxpayer's contention that sums received in settle-
ment of an antitrust suit represented capital in part..2 6 The com-
plaint in the suit appeared to demand damages for lost profits
rather than damages for injury to business in general and good-
will in particular. In Mathey v. Commissioner27 the appellate court
" As for a tort resulting in the physical destruction of specific assets and another tort involving
the impairment of property value, see and compare the two cases cited in footnotes 33 and 34 infro.
Further, note the textual discussion to which the two footnotes pertain.
228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955).
See also Ollie Beverly Rose, 8 T. C. 854 (1947).
se Chalmers Cullins, 24 T. C. 322 (1955).
27 177 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1949), cert. denied, :i39 U. S. 943 (1950). See Avery Corp. v. Fugate, 129
Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652 (1954) [state income case discussing a judgment rendered in Hyman & Co.
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held taxable a damage recovery in a patent infringement suit. In
doing so the court stated the rule applicable as follows:
If it was brought to recover lost profits, the proceeds are
taxable as income; if it was brought to recover for loss or
damage to capital, the proceeds are non-taxable.
28
In the early, leading case of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,29
the Supreme Court held includible in gross income a taxpayer's
recovery on a dredging contract for breach of warranty of the ma-
terials to be dredged. It was held that the damages did not consti-
tute capital even though, in a sense, they did no more than restore
to the taxpayer a portion of the expenditures made in earlier years
in partial performance of the unprofitable contract. The tax-
payer was reporting income on a yearly rather than on a completed
contract basis.. (c) Burden of proof. In a number of cases taxpayers have been
denied the desired treatment of an item as capital in whole or in
part because of a failure to establish to the satisfaction of the
court that all or a definite part or proportion of a sum received
as damages or in settlement was allocable to capital items, such
as goodwill, rather than to profits. Possibly no other factor has
been cited as often by the courts in recent years as a basis for
treating the disputed item as income. 0 At least as early as the
launching of the action for tort, breach of contract, breach of trust
or whatever, the taxpayer should consider the ways and means of
obtaining the maximum recovery after taxes. At the beginning
of the litigation is the time to lay the groundwork which will en-
able proper proof to be made in any later tax dispute. Moreover,
the basis of the assets alleged to have been damaged should be con-
sidered at the outset and later stages of the litigation.
Whether ordinary income or capital gain. By a statutory defini-
tion of general application a capital gain is one which arises from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset.3 Sometimes the facts are
such that an "involuntary conversion" may be relied on in lieu
of fulfilling the statutory prerequisite by the more common means
' But see note 1 supra at 181. Cf. Kane, Patent Low, 1954 Ann. Survey Am. L. 420, 422.
Z 282 U. S. 359 (1931). See Sanders v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955), cert.* denied,
350 U. S. 967 (1956) (concerning tax character of money received in settlement of claims under con-
struction contract).
*Cf. Phoenix Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1956) (failure of proof-com-
plaint not controlling); Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.) (basis not
shown), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 779 (1944); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1937); Chalmers Cullins, 24 T. C. 322 (1955).
8u Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222.
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of a sale or exchange.12 Thus in Walter A. Henshaw33 a judgment
attibutable to the negligent destruction of oil and gas in place
was held to involve an "involuntary conversion" of the asset. Since
the taxpayer had no unrecovered basis in the destroyed assets, he
was taxable on the entire judgment but, under the circumstances, at
the favorable rate applicable to a long-term capital gain. Damages
awarded for slander of title appear to stand on a different footing.
34
They represent capital recoveries, but in the ordinary case at least
would not be deemed to include gains, capital or otherwise.3
5
The case of Sarah A. Young "- involved a special type of sale
or exchange, that of stock surrendered to a corporation in return
for corporate assets distributed in liquidation. Actually, the tax-
payer had recovered a judgment in a stockholder's derivative suit.
but, as the corporation had been liquidated, the judgment inured to
the benefit of the taxpayer. The Tax Court held the judgment
should be treated as so much received on liquidation of the cor-
poration and be taxed accordingly. There being no unrecovered
basis in the stock, the taxpayer in this case was taxable on the
entirety of the judgment but as a capital gain, not ordinary in-
come.
In several instances it has been held that a settlement of a
seller's suit to rescind a sale of stock is tantamount to a sale of
stock for tax purposes and that the sum received is subject to treat-
ment as part of the purchase price 7 A purchaser who sued for
specific performance of the contract to sell but received cash in set-
tlement of the suit was held to have made a sale or exchange of
rights in a capital asset with the result that, like the sellers just
mentioned, he was able to shield his receipt from treatment as
ordinary income. 38 It is noteworthy, however, that in the latter case
the taxpayer's right to purchase did not arise from an employment
contract and did not constitute partial compensation for services
performed.39 In a case of the kind just mentioned, as in the case of
a judgment on a note given for services, the receipt would be
ordinary income.
4 0
Whether judgment may be attributed to several years. In sev-
eral recent cases taxpayers have sought to obtain for their settle-
ments or judgments the benefit of the provisions permitting the
attribution of income to several years. In one case the Tax Court
turned down a claim that a sum received in settlement of a suit
for breach of an employment contract deserved treatment as
"back pay" under a predecessor of section 1303.' 1 In another case
the same court held the income item did not relate to services
Id. § 1231.
23 T.C. 176 (1954).
Highlands Forms Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1314 (1940).
'See note 23 supra together with the pertinent text regarding recovery of capitol, and see
note 44 infra with the related text concerning the usual necessity of a sale or exchange as a pre-
requisite to capital gain treatment.
16 T. C. 1424 (1951).
31 Albert J. Goldsmith, 22 T. C. 1137 (1954) (overruled Government argument that "severance
pay" was involved); Margery K. Megargel, 3 T. C. 238 (1944). But see Frank T. Feagans, 23 T. C. 208
(1954) (no sole of capital asset, but, rather, a collection of compensation).
msQuincy A. Shaw McKeon, 6 T. C. 757 (1946).
sCf. Albert C. Becken, Jr., 5 T.C. 498 (1945).
40 Matilda S. Puelicher, 6 T. C. 300 (1946).
'1 Estate of Lester 0. Stearns, 14 T. C. 420 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 189 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1951).
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performed, as required by the provisions invoked, presenting
section 1301.42
Realization of gain deferred - condemnation - reorganization.
The present code, like the one which preceded it, contains provisions
spicificallly directed to condemnation and threats or imminence
of it. The purpose of the provisions is to permit any gain resulting
from the seizure or sale of property in such circumstances to be
deferred, or, perhaps, depending on later events, avoided alto-
gether.4 3 In a different type of case a taxpayer succeeded in having
a gain on the surrender of judgment claims held a "non-taxable
transfer" (i.e., the realization of gain deferred). 4 He had surren-
dered the claims to the debtor in consideration of the issuance
to him of stock of the debtor, a transaction which gave the taxpayer
and other judgment creditors control of the corporate debtor with-
in the meaning of section 112(b)(5), a section of the old law relat-
ing to non-taxable reorganizations.
Judgment collected by assignee -deferred collection -"tax-
benefit" rule. A purchaser of a judgment who collects upon it is not
deemed to have made a sale or exchange of the judgment.45 Any
gains on such transactions, therefore, are taxable as ordinary in-
come. In the well-known Dobson case,43 the Supreme Court held
that the Board of Tax Appeals had committed no error of law in
42 Curtis B. Doll, 23 T. C. 580 (1954), off'd per curiam, 228 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1955).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1033. For examples of the application of the "involunotry conversion"
section of the prior law, see Gaynor News Co., 22 T. C. 1172 (1954); Leon Strauss, 22 T. C. 140
(1954); Rev. Rul. 55-170, 1955-1 Cum Bull. 342.
"Alexander E. Duncon, 9 T. C. 468 (1947). Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351, with Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (5).
45 Galvin Hudson, 20 T. C. 734 (1953), off'd per curiam sub nom. Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954).
46Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943).
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applying the "tax benefit" rule-a rule which is now embodied
in section 111 of the code.
According to the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals in the
Dobson and other cases a judgment or cash settlement obtained by
a purchaser of stock on the basis of fraud perpetrated by the seller
of the stock is required to treat the receipt as ordinary income if
in a prior, closed year the stock was sold, a loss taken and a tax
benefit received. The receipt is income only to the extent of the tax
benefit or deduction derived from the loss taken in the closed year.
If no benefit were obtained from any such deduction, the subse-
quent recovery of judgment for fraud in the sale transaction would
include no income. There are evident distinctions between the
Dobson case and the McKean case 47 discussed above, but new cases
may arise in which it will be difficult to determine which or
what rule should govern.
Interest. The includibility in gross income of interest on a per-
sonal-injury judgment already has been mentioned. 48 In several
instances, too, the portion of a judgment labelled interest has been
recognized as includable in gross income.
4 9
PART II-ADVERSE JUDGMENTS
A litigant who has suffered an adverse judgment or made a pay-
ment in settlement of a suit does not ipso facto become entitled to
an income tax deduction. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as under prior law, certain liabilities and payments are deductible
and others are not; some items are deductible from gross income
without reservation and others are deductible to a limited extent
only.
Business expense. One of the best known deductions is that of
business expenses. Section 162(a) of the present code provides that
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business" are deductible.
It seems abundantly clear that a bus company should be per-
mitted to deduct the amount paid in satisfaction of a judgment for
personal injuries which were caused by the company in the course
of its business. The Tax Court has so held. 50 However, in the case
of an individual who paid a sum in settlement of a judgment ob-
tained against him because of an automobile accident, the same
court denied a deduction of the sum paid as a business expense
since it appeared the vehicle was being used at the time of the col-
lision on the business of the taxpayer's employer. 5' Had the accident
occurred during a trip made in the course of the individual tax-
payer's own business, the holding doubtless would have been
otherwise.52
47 See note 38 supra.
48 See notes 14 and 17 supra, and related text. But see Helvering v. Drier, 72 F.2d 75 (D. C. Cir.
1934) ("interest" plus payment by Mixed Claims Comm. did not 'equal basis of property taken).
"Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U. S. 399 (1943) (interest on condemnation award); W. H.
Kiser, 12 T. C. 178 (1949) (held no interest included in partition decree); Ollie Beverly Rose, 8 T. C.
854 (1947).
mo Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 16 T. C. 557 (1951).
51 Emanuel 0. Diamond, 19 T. C. 737 (1953).
2Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936).
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In the recent case of Mid-State Products Co. 3 the corporate
taxpayer was denied the deduction of a sum paid by it in settle-
ment of a suit in which the corporation and its president were co-
defendants. The suit, brought by a stockholder, had charged the
president with mismanagement and "milking" of the corporation.
Under the settlement, the president acquired the shares of the
complaining stockholder. Accordingly, the court took the position
that the taxpayer's payment was not made for corporate pur-
poses or "in carrying on any trade or business" of the taxpayer.
In another proceeding in which the corporate stake in a controversy
involving the officer was shown to be greater, a different result was
reached. 14
A trustee who personally paid a sum of money in settlement
of an action brought against a trust employee who had made a
fatal attack on a third person was not permitted to deduct his
payment either as a business expense or as a loss." The payment
was held not to be a business expense of the taxpayers person-
ally. In the absence of a showing that reimbursement from the
trust was impossible or impractical, the court was unwilling to
allow the sum paid to be deducted as a loss.
In Hales-Mullaly v. Commissioner,;5 a corporate taxpayer paid
out a considerable sum in settlement of a suit in which it was
joined as a co-defendant with its organizers and promoters and
a number of its employees. The suit charged fraud and a con-
spiracy to pirate the business of the camplainant-competitor. In ad-
dition to relying on the position that the payment did not relate
to carrying on the taxpayer's business, the court of appeals said
of the expenditure, "It is not ordinary."" The corporation's own
liability, if any, was extraordinary, according to the court, in that
it depended on the exceptional factor of the corporation's reten-
tion of the fruits of the fraud of others, to-wit, its organizers. In
passing on the same facts and a similar question concerning state
income taxes, the Oklahoma Supreme Court came to a contrary
conclusion."
That an adverse judgment in private litigation is based on
fraud has been held insufficient, per se, to make the payment an
extraordinary expense. 9 Indeed, not all penalties for public wrong-
"21 T. C. 696 (1954).
"Catholic News Publishing Co., 10 T. C. 73 (1948).
mCharles D. Whitney, 13 T. C. 897 (1949).
w 131 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1942).
57 Id. at 512.
68 Protest of Hales-Mullaly, Inc., 186 Okla. 693, 100 P.2d 274 (1940).
50 Helvering v. Hampton, 99 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1935).
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doing are denied deductibility. In 1954, the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue finally agreed with the courts, or came close to agree-
ing with them, when he ruled that penalties for violations of OPA
regulations are deductible if the violations were neither intentional
"nor the result of the failure to take practical precautions. "10
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the words "more or less legal"
have been interpolated into the above-quoted provisions of section
162 (a) at some point by those who administer and apply that sec-
tionY' For example, a payment made by a cement company in settle-
ment of a non-civil antitrust proceeding brought against it by the
State of Texas was held non-deductible as a business expense in
Universal Atlas Cement Co.,6 2 despite that taxpayer's denial of guilt
in connection with the settlement. So also was a deduction denied
in William F. Davis, Jr.63 with respect to "insiders profits" paid to a
corporation. Though a number of its members dissented in the Davis
case, the Tax Court held that a deduction of such a payment,
whether as a business expense or a loss, would frustrate a well-
defined national policy.
In another case which involved "insiders profits" the taxpayer's
obligation to disgorge was less clear but a payment was made in
' Rev. Rul. 54-204, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 49. But cf. Julain Lentin, 23 T. C. 112 (1954), off'd, 226
F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 934 (1956) (penalties for willful OPA violations held
non-deductible). See generally Annot., 20 A. L. R. 2d 600 (1951).
61 But cf. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943); Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635
(7th Cir. 1956).
659 T. C. 971 (1947). off'd per curiom, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied. 336 U. S. 962.
(1949).
0 17 T. C. 549 (1951).
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settlement of the possible liability. In this case, the Tax Court
was willing to allow a deduction of the payment either as an ex-
pense or a loss.6 4 In Commissioner v. Macy," the beneficiaries of
certain testamentary trusts filed objections to the accounts which
the taxpayers, as trustees, had presented for judicial approval.
There was no charge of bad faith. Without admitting liability but in
order to settle the contested matters, the taxpayers consented to
a surcharge of their accounts and placed personal funds, in an
amount equal to the surcharge, to the credit of the principal ac-
counts of the trust estates. The payment was held deductible as
a business expense both by the Tax Court and on appeal.
Capital expenditure.16 In the last of the foregoing cases one of
the rejected arguments of the Commissioner was that the pay-
ment credited to the principal of the respective trusts was a capital
expenditure and thus not deductible. In another recent case the Tax
Court overruled a government contention that a payment made
in settlement of a suit for commissions, damages for breach of con-
tract, and similar items, actually represented the purchase price of
an interest in a patent.67
The Commissioner is more likely to favor the position that a
84 William L. Butler, 17 T. C. 675 (1951).
05215 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1954). Accord Great Island Holding Corp., 5 T. C. 150 (1945).
06What constitutes a capital expenditure, like what constitutes a capital recovery, a question
discussed in Part I, pertains to the whole income tax system, the entire code rather thcn any par-
ticular section. This is tantamount to saying that the distinction between income and capital and
between capital expenditure and revenue charges entails recourse to what may be called
"the common law of taxes."
07 Camloc Fastener Co., 10 T. C. 1024 (1948).
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payment is a capital expenditure than is the taxpayer. Such was
the situation in the cases just mentioned. 8 However, in James E.
Caldwell & Co.6 9 it was the petitioner which wanted to have one of
its payments so classified. The payment in question had been made
in settlement of a suit which had been brought against the taxpayer
by a judgment-creditor of its president for the purpose of setting
aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance. The Tax Court held, with
several members of the court dissenting, that the taxpayer could
not add the payment to the basis of the property for the purpose of
computing a gain on the sale of the property.
Non-business expense. In Samuel G. Swaim"t a taxpayer had
paid part of a commission claimed by a real estate broker, but had
done so without admitting liability, merely to avoid litigation. The
Tax Court held that the sum so paid was spent to conserve property
and so was deductible as a non-business expense. The language of
the governing section of the current code, section 212, corresponds
with that of the prior law except that it has been broadened to pro-
vide expressly for the deduction of certain expenses relating to
taxes. Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary.expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection
or refund of any tax.
7 1
In a case in which the facts were essentially similar to those in
the Macy case discussed above, the taxpayer claimed a deduction
as a non-business expense. The Tax Court's decision granting the
deduction was reversed on appeal by the same appellate court
which later considered the Macy case.72 In the latter case the court
of appeals did not overrule its prior decision expressly, it at all,
but distinguished the two cases on the basis of the section of law
invoked by the respective taxpayers. However, it would seem more
reasonable, in the ordinary case of a non-professional trustee (as all
these appear to have been), to grant such a deduction as a non-
business expense and to disallow it, if at all, as a business expense.
A taxpayer who purchased a release of a claim made against
him under the warranty provisions of a deed was denied the right
to deduct the payment either as an ordinary loss or as a non-business
expense.73 The Tax Court held the payment was deductible only
in the limited way prescribed for capital losses. The transaction of
sale and conveyance which had occurred a few years earlier than
0 See also Levitt & Sons, 5 T. C. 913 (1945), aff'd per curia-, 160 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1947).
24 T. C. 597 (1955).
-020 T. C. 1022 (1953).
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 212.
7 Julius A. Heide, 8 T. C. 314 (1947), rev'd, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948). For discussion of the
general relation between business and non-business expense, see Bingham Trust v. Commissioner,
325 U. 5. 365 (1945).
( Estate of James M. Shannonhouse, 21 T. C. 422 (1953). But cf. Samuel G. Swain, 20 T. C. 1022
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the payment aforesaid was capital in nature and, according to the
holding of the court, imparted its character as such to the adjust-
ment made under the warranty contained in the deed.
Capital loss. In the case just described the court relied on the
holding of the Supreme- Court in the Arrowsmith case.14 In the
latter case, the taxpayer had paid a judgment given against a
liquidated corporation of which he was a transferee. Several years
earlier, at the time of the liquidation and in connection with it, the
taxpayer had reported a capital gain and had paid the tax for the
year accordingly. The Tax Court had considered the payment of
the judgment as a fully deductible ordinary loss. The Supreme
Court differed. In a decision from which three justices dissented
the Supreme Court held that the loss fell squarely within the defi-
nition of "capital losses" contained in the sections pertaining to such
losses-the necessary sale or exchange presumably being the one
which had occurred for tax purposes at the time of the liquidation.
This view of the situation meant a much smaller deduction for the
taxpayer than would have been allowed under the ruling of the
Tax Court.
Some years before, the Supreme Court had held that a capital
loss occurred when a vendee's interest in real estate constituting a
capital asset was cut off by a foreclosure saleT5 According to the
Court, the sale on foreclosure, though involuntary, was a sale
within the meaning of the capital-loss provisions then in force.
Moreover, the sale rather than the decree on foreclosure was held
to be the definitive event establishing the loss. The principle of
the case doubtless is broad enough to cover the ordinary foreclosure
of mortgagors' interests in capital assets.
Ordinary loss. In many instances a losing litigant or other tax-
payer seeking to deduct a judgment or other payment makes the
alternative claim that it is either an expense or an ordinary loss.
Whenever either type of deduction is allowable at all, it is allow-
able in full, but, as would be expected, the respective sections differ
in language and to some extent in coverage. The text of section 165
of the current code resembles that of prior provisions and, so far
as here pertinent, reads as follows':
14Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U. S. 6 (1952). For current capital loss provisions see Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211-12 & 1222.




American Founders Building-1330 Leyden Street-P.O. Box 7037, Capitol Hill Station
A Colorado Company Owned by Over 3000 Coloradans




In the case of an individual, the deduction under section
(a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into
for profit, though not connected with a trade or business;
and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade
or business, if such losses arise from fire, storm, ship-
wreck, or other casualty, or from theft.7 6
While there is no express statutory limitation on the losses de-
ductible by corporations, certain limitations have been implied.
For a reason not explained in the court's opinion, the facts of the
Hales-Mullaly case discussed above did not justify an ordinary loss
deduction. It may be, as a subsequent Tax Court decision implies,
that an essential condition for deducting a corporate loss resulting
from a settlement is an approved degree of relationship between
the corporate business and the loss.7 Moreover, as in the case of an
expense, an ordinary loss deduction appears subject to the implied
condition that it is not generally allowable, either to an individual or
to a corporation, with respect to an adjudged fine, penalty or the
like.7"
At times, as indicated earlier, an ordinary loss deduction may
be denied on the ground that the loss in question is more appro-




The foregoing, of course, is no more than introduction to certain
common phases of the law of federal income taxes. It is hoped,
however, that the elementary nature of the study will be one of its
chief merits. To suggest solutions for all likely situations, even if
possible, would be to place the cart before the horse. In tax law as
elsewhere, the solution of a specific problem depends upon its rec-
ognition and that in turn is conditioned upon an understanding of
the general nature of the various types of problems which have
been, and thus may be, encountered in litigation. If the present ar-
ticle contributes to such an understanding-to such a recognition of
problems and possibilities-it has served its purpose. Particular
solutions, like heaven, can wait. Besides, something should be
left to litigation!
' nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165.
SJames E. Caldwell & Co., 24 T. C. 597 (1955) (2d question presented).
'5 See notes 60, 61, 62 and 63 supro, and related text. Cf. United States v. Algemene Kuntzijde
Unie, N. V., 226 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1955) deduction of loss denied as contrary to national policy);
Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) (loss deduction denied because of state policy).
-- It should be noted, too, that the ordinary loss and bad debt provisions are mutually exclusive.
Spring City Foundry C. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182 (1934). A non-business bad debt results in a
capital loss. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166 (d). Cf. Thomas Lonergan Trust, 6 T. C. 715 (1946) (un-
usual question whether payment of a judgment against a decedent was deductible by the trustee as
currently distributable income reportable by the beneficiary under the provisions relating to trusts;
deduction disallowed).
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